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1. Introduction
Soon after its reported appearance, Covid-19 spread rapidly around the 
world. The global crisis triggered by coronavirus has created a situation of 
profound uncertainty, which many say will persist for an indeterminate – and 
possibly extended – period of time. The uncertainty caused by the pandemic 
is at the same time medical, economic, ethical and political. Among other 
things, it has brought to light how vulnerable human beings still are in the 
face of highly infectious diseases, whose spread can only be slowed down by 
a concerted international effort, and which call for cooperation both at the 
individual, national and international level.
It is perhaps in virtue of the widespread uncertainty it has caused and the 
recognition of our human fragility that Covid-19 has been defined by some 
as the ‘Great Equalizer’. The virus is a potential threat to every human being 
and forces us to confront our shared vulnerability in times of crisis. But how 
equalizing has this crisis really been? What reflections can be drawn from the 
way Covid-19 has affected individual human beings and our societies?
In this paper, I will discuss some important ethical and political dimensions 
of vulnerability in conditions of uncertainty. I will start by defining vulnera-
bility, arguing that it is both inherent to the human condition, or ontological, 
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and relational – that is, situational or context-specific (Mackenzie et al. 2013). 
Indeed, on the one hand, vulnerability is the capacity to suffer harm, shared 
by all human beings; in other words, an ontological condition of our common 
humanity (Tronto 1993, 2010, 2015; MacIntyre 1999; Butler 2004, 2009; 
Cavarero 2007; Fineman 2008). On the other hand, vulnerability is relational 
in character: while everyone can be harmed, some individuals and groups are 
more susceptible to harm than others, in virtue of their relative powerlessness 
in defending their own interests (Goodin 1985). This understanding of vulner-
ability as a concept that is both ontological and relational is especially salient 
in times of crisis, such as the one brought about by Covid-19. In a pandemic, 
everyone is vulnerable, and is at the same time a potential source of other peo-
ple’s vulnerability. However, not everyone is equally vulnerable. The degree of 
one’s vulnerability depends on one’s situation, which is determined by one’s 
social and economic circumstances, and the web of relationships one is part of.
After having defined vulnerability, I will then proceed to illustrate why it 
matters, especially in challenging times. More specifically, I will show how vul-
nerability in conditions of uncertainty can threaten individuals’ sense of self, 
and thus their autonomy. As argued by Andrea Sangiovanni, to have a sense of 
self is to have a certain self-conception “of the values, commitments, concerns 
that are central to one’s life, the relationships and roles that makes one the 
‘kind of person’ one is” (2017, 79). This conception can be very minimal. It 
just requires that individuals feel that they have some control over the existence 
they lead. One’s sense of self can be damaged or broken by internal and external 
events, such as illness or bereavement, and by the actions of others. In challeng-
ing times, such as during a global pandemic, the uncertainty experienced by 
individuals may be so profound as to constitute an attack on their very sense of 
self. Individuals may feel that they have no control over what is happening to 
them and fail to see their place in an unknown world.
Having a sense of self is not the same as being autonomous, but is a 
precondition for it. I will claim that autonomy is the capacity to be part au-
thor of one’s life (Raz 1986) or, more modestly, the capacity to resist rule by 
others (Garnett 2013). Autonomy is usually taken to require the availability 
of an array of acceptable, meaningful options. In a global crisis, a significant 
number of such options are taken away. As a result, individual autonomy is 
diminished, and with it the well-being of individuals.
Autonomy, too, can be understood in relational terms. Feminist phi-
losophers have argued that autonomy is constitutively relational: it is only 
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through our relationships with others that one can develop and exercise au-
tonomy (Mackenzie, Stoljar 2000; Mackenzie et al. 2013). Relational ac-
counts of autonomy are sensitive to the idea, mentioned above, that human 
beings share a certain vulnerability to others – and that some are in fact more 
vulnerable than others. Again, this means that one’s degree of autonomy is 
dependent on one’s social circumstances and the relationships one can have 
in such circumstances.
I will finally argue that recognising the ontological and relational aspects 
of vulnerability, its role in the formation of one’s sense of self, and its relation 
with autonomy, can help us to better understand some of the harms inflicted 
by the pandemic, and how the uncertainty caused by it has affected different 
people in different ways.1 Contrary to the belief that Covid-19 is a ‘great 
equalizer’, I maintain that the pandemic reflects existing vulnerabilities and, 
in many cases, exacerbates them. While there is reason to worry about the 
implications of the current crisis on individual liberties (Agamben 2020), the 
fact remains that not everyone’s liberty has been – and is going to be – equally 
compromised in these challenging times. The pandemic has affected indi-
viduals’ autonomy and well-being along pre-existing lines of vulnerability in 
terms of class, gender, ethnicity, age, occupation, access to healthcare services, 
and so on. While most of us are confronting uncertainty and have had to 
adapt their life plans to the current situation, not everyone has seen their 
sense of self attacked to the same degree, or lost control over the course of 
their own life in equally dramatic ways.
I will conclude by considering what kind of response human vulnerability 
in times of crisis calls for. In particular, I will argue that a promising way to 
counteract uncertainty would be to adopt a solidaristic approach, based on 
an understanding of solidarity as a relational concept (Baylis et al. 2008). In 
other words, I will argue that it is through solidarity that individuals’ vulner-
abilities can be mitigated, and their autonomy promoted.
1 It is worth remembering here that vulnerability is an integral part of self (as argued 
below), and can thus coexist with an awareness of one’s autonomy, which the pandemic 
may put into question. I thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion. For more on 
this topic, see the essays collected in Straehle 2017.   
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2. The ‘great equalizer’
Covid-19 has been defined as a ‘great equalizer’ by government officials, 
mainstream media and even celebrities (Mein 2020). Intuitively, this may 
seem like a plausible definition. Coronavirus does not discriminate between 
individuals, but it subjects all human beings to the risk of infection, disease 
and death – regardless of one’s wealth, social circumstances, or age. And yet, 
it is not difficult to see why the label is misleading. While everyone’s health 
and well-being can be threatened by the virus, not everyone’s health and 
well-being are equally threatened. The pandemic has affected different people 
differently, along dimensions such as age, gender, ethnicity, health status, 
political status (ranging from full citizen to asylum seeker and illegal immi-
grant), employment status, occupation, geography, and so on. 
The global reach of the crisis and the persistent condition of uncertainty 
caused by the pandemic may have had some equalizing effects on humanity 
as a whole. It may even be argued that the common threat represented by the 
virus has the potential to unite people in the recognition of our shared fragil-
ity and precariousness. However, this should not bring us to underestimate 
the way the current crisis reflects existing inequalities between different sec-
tions of the population and is in many cases exacerbating them, with impli-
cations for the persistence of such inequalities in the long run.2 For instance, 
individuals with underlying health conditions and older people are more ex-
posed to the dangers associated with infection than the healthy and young. 
Care workers, healthcare workers and key workers in general are more at risk 
of contagion than those in other occupations. Moreover, in addition to the 
differential impact that coronavirus may have on individuals, there are other 
factors that contribute to significant inequalities between differently situated 
people in times of pandemic. Keyworkers, such as carers, nurses, cleaners, 
and those involved in food production and distribution – to name only a few 
examples – not only risk their health and possibly their lives in the current 
situation, but are in many cases members of minority groups or immigrants 
in low-paid jobs. The precarious condition they find themselves in is thus 
2 See Blundell et al. 2020 for a UK-centred discussion of the impact of Covid-19 on 
existing social and economic disparities. Some of the following examples are discussed in 
greater detail in their work, whose findings are relevant, and could be applied, to other 
western countries in similar conditions. 
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not only marked by uncertainty in relation to their physical health, but so-
cial and economic insecurity as well. Among those who have lost their jobs 
or are unable to find one in the middle of a global pandemic, young people 
and those with limited education and from a disadvantaged background are 
overrepresented. Thus, while they may not face disproportionate health risks 
in comparison to other members of society they are still negatively affected 
by the situation in a way that is bound to have effects on the already exist-
ing economic disparities between the younger and the older sections of the 
population, and between the privileged and educated and the less privileged 
and less educated. Another example concerns the condition of women: while 
there is evidence that women are in general less affected by the most severe 
manifestations and complications of Covid-19, many of them have had to 
take upon themselves the lion share of childcare and domestic work in the 
family, and face difficulties in reconciling their paid job (if they still have one) 
with the unpaid and often unrecognised labour they perform for the benefit 
of their children, partners and elderly relatives. And so on. 
These examples prompt a reflection on the differential impact of the pan-
demic on differently situated people and the intersection between different 
kinds of vulnerability. In fact, understanding both the sense in which coro-
navirus might be seen as the great equalizer and the sense in which it is not 
requires an understanding of what it means to be vulnerable on the face of it, 
and what such vulnerability entails.  
3. Vulnerability defined
Vulnerability can be understood as the capacity to suffer harm shared by all 
human beings (Tronto 1993, 2010, 2015; MacIntyre 1999; Butler 2004, 
2009; Cavarero 2007; Fineman 2008), that is, an “ontological condition of 
our humanity” (Mackenzie et al. 2013, 4).3 At the same time, vulnerability is 
relational in character: while everyone can be harmed, some individuals and 
groups are more susceptible to certain harms than others, in virtue of their 
relative powerlessness in defending their own interests (Goodin 1985). Thus, 
3 For more in-depth analyses of the ontological dimension of vulnerability (including 
discussions of the ways in which the concept has been framed and developed by Butler 
and Cavarero) see Bernardini et al. 2018.
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vulnerability is both inherent to the human condition (or ontological) and 
situational (or relational), or context-specific (Mackenzie et al. 2013, 7).4 For 
the present discussion, this notion of vulnerability applies to both those who 
can be potentially harmed and those who are actually harmed – by human and 
non-human agents. While a distinction can be made between dispositional (or 
potential) and occurrent (or actual) vulnerability (Mackenzie et al. 2013, 8), 
such a distinction does not play a decisive role in the account offered here.5
In the situation of uncertainty caused by a pandemic, individuals experience 
both ontological and situational or relational vulnerability. Everyone is onto-
logically vulnerable in the face of a serious and widespread threat to human 
health – that is, everyone is liable to suffering harms caused by the virus. At the 
same time, as argued above, individuals are situated differently within a society 
and are liable to suffering harms related to their specific conditions: in other 
words, individuals are relationally or situationally vulnerable not only to the 
virus, but to its social and economic consequences as well. Those who defend 
the notion that the virus is the great equalizer stop at the first dimension of 
vulnerability, that of ontological vulnerability, disregarding its situational or re-
lational aspects. While it is important to recognise our shared human capacity 
to suffer harm, this shared vulnerability is not the whole story.
But why should vulnerability – and especially relational vulnerabili-
ty – matter, in this context? I think it matters because vulnerability, partic-
ularly in uncertain and challenging times, can threaten individuals’ sense of 
self, and thus their autonomy. 
4 See also Mackenzie et al. 2012.
5 As Doris Schroeder and Eugenijus Gefenas have noted, vulnerability is a concept that 
faces the twofold challenge of being at the same time too vague and too widely applied to 
different categories of population for it to be useful, especially in bioethics (2009, 113). 
To remedy this, they argue for a more precise definition of vulnerability. “To be vulne-
rable”, they claim, “means to face a significant probability of incurring an identifiable 
harm while substantially lacking ability and/or means to protect oneself ” (Schroeder, 
Gefenas 2009, 117). In other words, they argue for a definition of vulnerability that only 
takes into account the situational or relational aspects of vulnerability, and only when 
they are due to an a ‘identifiable harm’. They might, however, agree with the inclusion of 
both occurrent and dispositional vulnerability, so long as the latter means that there is a 
‘significant probability’ that the potential harms one could suffer will occur.
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4. Uncertainty, sense of self and autonomy
To see how uncertainty, sense of self and autonomy are connected let me 
first clarify what the term ‘sense of self ’ means. Andrea Sangiovanni has 
argued that to have a sense of self is to have a certain self-conception “of 
the values, commitments, concerns that are central to one’s life, the rela-
tionships and roles that makes one the ‘kind of person’ one is” (2017, 79).6 
This conception can be very minimal. It does not need to form a grand 
narrative of one’s life and plans, or oblige one to reflect upon and embrace 
every single aspect of one’s personality. It just requires that individuals feel 
that they can at least partly shape the course of their lives, and that they can 
maintain some sort of integrity in the existence they lead. Having a sense 
of self, in this view, amounts to having the capacity to self-interpret oneself 
and form a certain narrative (however local and episodic) of who one is: 
“[b]y acting, deciding, pursuing, we shape the kinds of people we are and 
can become, and by reflecting on who we are and can become, we give rise 
to our actions, decisions and pursuits” (Sangiovanni 2017, 79).7 Having a 
sense of self is not the same as being autonomous. As I will argue below, 
autonomy requires more than just the feeling that one is part author of 
one’s life and maintaining integrity. An individual may have a sense of self 
and yet fail to be autonomous – for instance, because of a lack of acceptable 
alternatives. In other words, autonomy requires that both ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ conditions be met.8 Thus, the conditions for autonomy are more 
demanding than the conditions for one’s self-conception. Nonetheless, the 
formation and preservation of one’s sense of self also requires that some 
conditions be in place. One’s sense of self can be damaged or broken by 
internal and external events, such as illness or bereavement. In addition, 
one’s sense of self can be obliterated by the actions of others. Individuals 
6 The importance of having a sense of self, that is, of being a certain kind of person and 
knowing what sort of person one is has been famously adduced by Robert Nozick as one 
of the reasons why we should refuse to plug into the ‘experience machine’ – that is, why 
we should prefer to have ‘true’ experiences, however unpleasant, over pleasurable but 
‘fake’ ones. See Nozick 1974, esp. 43. 
7 See also Velleman 2005 and Schechtman 2011.
8 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting I should clarify the distinction between 
having a sense of self and being autonomous.
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need certain conditions to be able to develop and maintain a sense of self – 
as such, they are also vulnerable to attacks against it. Everyone shares that 
vulnerability to a certain extent, but some are more vulnerable than others. 
When people’s access to the necessary conditions to form and preserve a 
sense of self is diminished, their vulnerability increases.
Being severely ill and having to fight for one’s life and well-being can be ex-
perienced as a struggle to maintain one’s sense of self intact as well as to secure 
one’s physical survival. However, not only those who get sick may have their 
sense of self threatened. The uncertainty endured by individuals – the most vul-
nerable above all – in a public health crisis can be so profound as to constitute 
an attack to their sense of self. Individuals may feel that they have lost control 
over the course of their life and that they can no longer maintain their moral 
and psychological integrity. They could be at a loss as to what their place in an 
unknown world is supposed to be. Their relationships and roles in life may be 
subverted as well. In the previous section, I claimed that the account defended 
here includes both occurrent and dispositional vulnerability. However, most of 
the examples mentioned concerned occurrent vulnerability. Now we can see 
that uncertainty, too, constitutes a form of harm. This is again more serious 
for the most disadvantaged. Uncertainty as well as actual harm can threaten 
individuals’ sense of self, and make them vulnerable.
Having a sense of self, as argued, is not the same as being autonomous, but 
appears to be a precondition for it. Autonomy can be defined as the capacity to 
be part author of one’s life (Raz 1986) or, more modestly, the capacity to resist 
rule by others (Garnett 2013). This capacity, as argued above, is not simply a 
matter of ‘feeling’ that one has at least partial control over the course of one’s life 
and forming a narrative of it, as it is the case for one’s sense of self. In my view, 
a person is autonomous when a number of internal and external conditions 
are met. The first one is that the individual is endowed with some intellectual 
skills: the capacity for self-reflection (Christman 1991), or a minimal level of 
rationality (Raz 1986). The second condition for autonomy is that an individual 
is independent, or in the position to develop their preferences and desires free 
from manipulation and coercion. This makes the account of autonomy offered 
here a procedural or content-neutral account: what matters for autonomy is not 
the content of the desires one has or the choices one makes, but whether the 
process whereby one has acquired certain preferences was one in which their in-
dividual freedom and independence were safeguarded and promoted. The third 
condition for autonomy is that an individual is presented with meaningful or 
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acceptable alternatives to choose from (Raz 1986). The fourth condition is that 
an individual is willing to take self-responsibility for their choices and actions, 
and hold oneself answerable for them (Westlund 2009).
An essential aspect of autonomy – as understood here – is that it is depen-
dent on context, significance of available options, and a disposition to hold 
oneself accountable for what one does. In other words, autonomy is constitu-
tively relational. The requirement of independence signals the importance of 
living in an autonomy-promoting environment: one cannot be, or become, 
autonomous if one’s social milieu stifles the possibility of autonomy, through 
the manipulation of one’s preferences and desires, or by coercing one into 
making certain choices one would not otherwise regard as one’s own. An-
swerability, too, depends on one’s social environment. Someone is unlikely to 
be autonomous if they have never been encouraged to take responsibility for 
their actions, or if they have been taught that they are not the kind of person 
of whom self-responsibility is expected. The importance of one’s environ-
ment for autonomy is even more evident if we consider another requirement, 
i.e. the availability of meaningful or acceptable options. Options are socially 
determined: their existence “consists in part in the existence of certain so-
cial conditions” (Raz 1986, 205). In times of pandemic, for instance, one’s 
options are significantly reduced not only as a direct consequence of being 
exposed to infection, but also in relation to the norms, rules and provisions 
put in place by one’s society and the kinds of relationships one is part of. 
Proponents of relational accounts of autonomy claim that autonomy is a 
“socially constituted capacity, in the twin senses that its development and exer-
cise requires extensive social scaffolding and support and that its development 
and exercise can be thwarted by exploitative or oppressive interpersonal rela-
tionships and by repressive or unjust social and political institutions” (Macken-
zie et al. 2013, 17). Relational accounts of autonomy are sensitive to the idea, 
discussed earlier, that human beings share a certain vulnerability to others – and 
that some are in fact more vulnerable than others – at the same time that others 
enable to us to become and remain autonomous throughout our lives. The 
focus is on the ways in which individuals and institutions can either impinge 
upon one’s capacity for independent actions and choices or make it a genuine 
possibility (or, at least sometimes, both). In the current situation, many options 
have been taken away from individuals, thus reducing the extent to which they 
have been able to be part authors of their lives. In addition, the pandemic has 
deeply affected human relationships, changing the way we see ourselves and 
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interact with others. In other words, individuals have experienced a loss of 
autonomy, a threat to their sense of self, and a persistent feeling of uncertainty 
– all of this because we are fundamentally relational beings, whose identity and 
welfare depend on the relationships we are part of.
Because we are socially situated creatures, our relationships with others 
and the environment in which we live at least partly determine the degree 
of autonomy we can enjoy, the level of integrity our sense of self can main-
tain, and the extent to which we are vulnerable in the face of attacks to 
our well-being, including those caused by uncertainty in difficult times. The 
long-term effects of Covid-19 cannot be fully understood or counteracted 
without taking into consideration its social and relational ramifications. An 
effective solution to the current crisis can only be found by adopting a rela-
tional approach to public health.
5. A solidaristic approach 
Relational accounts of public health ethics aim at promoting the public interest 
and the common good, based on the relational aspects of personhood, auton-
omy, and social justice (Baylis et al. 2008). Discussing pandemic plans in the 
wake of the 2003 SARS epidemic, Baylis et al. have argued that “[th]e nature 
and scope of public health require an approach to ethics that is itself ‘public’ 
rather than individualistic, i.e., one that understands the social nature of public 
health work” (2008, 200). Such an approach “must do more than simply iden-
tify the tensions between individual benefit and community benefit, individual 
freedom and public safety, resource allocation to known affected individuals 
and to the community as a whole” (Baylis et al. 2008, 200). In other words, an 
ethical approach to public health “must make clear the complex ways in which 
individuals are inseparable from communities and build on the fact that the 
interests of both are interrelated” (Baylis et al. 2008, 200). 
Instead of focusing on the values and priorities of individuals, relational 
approaches move beyond the traditional liberal concern for individual free-
dom from interference, dignity and privacy – regarded as too narrow to pro-
vide the kind of justification for the changes that public health aims to bring 
about (Jennings 2007) – to encompass the social and political context that 
determines the health conditions of communities and populations (Rogers 
2006). In other words, relational approaches conceive of public health ethics 
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as something that involves individuals in the context they live in and their 
relationships with others, arguing for the need to build trust and solidarity 
between them (Kotalik 2005), and between individuals and public officials 
(Bellagio Group 2007). Thus public health, understood in relational terms, 
refers “to what society does collectively to assure the conditions for people to 
be healthy” (Baylis et al. 2008, 199).
A relational understanding of public health calls for what Baylis et al. 
call ‘relational solidarity’. In their view, solidarity should not be grounded in 
self-interest and self-preservation, but motivated by a concern for others and 
for communal well-being. Relational solidarity is based on the recognition of 
our shared vulnerability and common interest in survival, safety and securi-
ty. It is also sensitive to the idea, explored above, that we are not all equally 
vulnerable, and can be the source of other people’s vulnerability. Relational 
solidarity requires that we accept responsibility for ourselves and our actions, 
are willing “to be held accountable for others (especially the weakest and 
most disadvantaged in society)” and are aware of our mutual vulnerability 
and interdependence (Baylis et al. 2008, 205).
Defenders of relational solidarity argue that the term has more than rhe-
torical value. Indeed, different concepts of solidarity have been put forward 
in the literature that are not built on the relational aspects of vulnerability and 
personhood (Dean 1995; Bayertz 1999; Wildt 1999; Houtepen, ter Muelen 
2000; Hoedemaekers et al. 2007; Kolers 2016; Banting, Kymlicka 2017). 
Advocates of relational solidarity assume a position that is different from 
both those who understand solidarity as stemming from mere self-interest 
and those who see it in terms of a commitment to a pre-existing common 
identity: relational solidarity “values interconnections without being steeped 
in assumptions about commonality or collective identity. What matters is a 
shared interest in survival, safety and security” (Baylis et al. 2008, 205).
Arguably, adopting a solidaristic approach to public health (where solidarity 
is understood in relational terms and is sensitive to the differences in individ-
uals’ vulnerabilities) can be most effective in tackling the challenges brought 
about by pandemics. It seems evident that treating individual patients is not 
enough. Stopping the spread of coronavirus and developing the tools to erad-
icate it will require a concerted effort at the local, national and international 
level. As argued by Baylis et al., relational solidarity calls for the recognition of 
our own responsibility, as well as the responsibility of governments and states, 
in responding to public health challenges and protecting the most vulnerable. 
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Thus, it may be argued, solidarity requires that we do not simply act in our im-
mediate self-interest: our actions should be aimed at preserving the interests of 
others, as well as our own. This should not be particularly demanding as we all 
share a common interest in survival, safety and security. While people may find 
it difficult to care about others whom they do not know or live far away from 
them, a powerful motivating force for keeping our actions in check is that, at 
the very least, we can be moved by the thought that what we do is for the bene-
fit of the people we do care about: our family, our friends, our neighbours. Seen 
under this light, accepting to make some sacrifices for the common good can 
be seen as an act of solidarity (Magnani 2020), stemming from the recognition 
that we are all vulnerable, and that some are more vulnerable than others.
While it may be true that, at the very least, individuals could be moved 
to support solidaristic measures by a concern for their loved ones, it may 
prove more difficult to persuade them to act in solidarity with people they 
do not have any close relationship with: fellow citizens, strangers and others 
whom they do not personally know or are in contact with. In other words, 
it may be argued that while a concern for one’s friends and family can be a 
powerful motivating force it is insufficient, on its own, to sustain solidarity 
as a general principle of action.9 This brings us to an important aspect of the 
solidaristic approach defended here: while solidarity requires the willingness 
of individuals to do their part, other political actors are needed to sustain and 
support solidarity in society. In other words, solidarity has multiple sourc-
es, including the individuals forming a political community, political agents 
such as organized social movements and political parties, and public insti-
tutions and policies (Banting, Kymlicka 2017). Solidarity, understood as a 
set of “attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in 
time of need”, as Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka have argued, “does not 
emerge spontaneously or naturally from economic and social processes but 
is inherently built or eroded through political action” (2017, 3). Self-interest 
alone – including one’s interest for the well-being and survival of one’s loved 
ones – cannot on its own sustain solidarity at the societal level unless it is also 
supported by the concerted action of relevant political actors. 
The view that solidarity involves the interplay of different political actors 
(including individuals as members of society) has at least two implications. 
9 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this important objection.
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First, because a solidaristic approach to public health requires that we take 
responsibility for what we do, it may also encourage us to be more vigilant of 
what elected officials and governments do. We can accept limitations on our 
freedom, but there must be good reasons for them. We can accept that some 
people may be prevented from going to work, but there must be adequate 
provisions to compensate for that. We can make some sacrifices, but only if 
they are necessary and effective, and only if others are also making them in-
stead of free riding on our sense of civic duty and good will. Second, society’s 
authorities and public institutions must be reliable and able to build a rela-
tionship of trust with the individuals they are meant to represent. Solidarity 
is a collective effort: it only works if a sufficient number or people do their 
part, and if governments and other public institutions are held accountable 
for the measures they implement – which need to be procedurally fair, trans-
parent, effective, contestable, and proportionate to their intended aim.10
I have argued above that measures aimed at containing the spread of the 
virus may limit individual autonomy. Such measures range from full lock-
downs to social distancing, mask wearing, reduced opening hours for bars 
and restaurants, contact tracing, and travel restrictions – just to name a few. 
Many options are taken away from us in these circumstances, thus limiting 
our scope for choice and action. Now we can see, however, that adopting a 
solidaristic approach may be a way to take back a degree of control over what 
happens to us. Accepting some limits to the options open to us may be a way 
to protect the meaningful relationships that make us the persons we are, thus 
protecting our autonomy in turn. Recognising our own vulnerability and 
that of others may make us less isolated and stronger in dealing with uncer-
tainty, thus safeguarding our sense of self and well-being, and those of others.
6. Two objections, and possible responses
Two objections could be raised against the solidaristic approach to public 
health defended here. Let us consider them in turn. First, it may be argued 
that this approach is too optimistic about individuals’ willingness to comply 
with restrictive norms for the sake of protecting others. Human beings are 
10 For more on this, see Emanuela Ceva’s work on procedural interactive justice (2016) 
and the wrongness of political corruption as lack of accountability (2018).
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naturally (that is, evolutionarily) limited in their capacity to care for others: 
their concern extends only to their own interests and those of the people in 
their immediate vicinity – their family and friends (Persson, Savulescu 2012). 
Human beings are also biased towards caring more for the near than the dis-
tant future, which further limits their motivation for acting in a cooperative 
way (Persson, Savulescu 2012). True enough, human beings are also capable 
of an inclusivist morality, especially when their material conditions allow for 
it (Powell, Buchanan 2016). However, this is clearly not possible in times of 
crisis such as during a global pandemic: an inclusivist morality is a “luxury 
good”, which remains confined to “well-resourced populations with robust 
healthcare infrastructures, markets, rule of law, reduced rates of criminality, 
high rates of education and literacy, and so forth” (Powell, Buchanan 2016, 
247). With healthcare infrastructures under significant pressures, and in the 
midst of a global economic crisis, it is difficult to envisage how individuals 
may be expected to embrace solidarity instead of devoting their energies to 
safeguarding their own interests and those of their loved ones. 
A possible response to this worry is that solidarity can operate at the local 
or community level to start with, as long as individuals recognise that their 
well-being and autonomy are dependent on their relationships with others and 
the environment surrounding them. Someone might still reply, however, that 
local or parochial solidarity cannot be the answer to the global crisis human 
beings currently face. If solidarity is to be effective, it needs to extend well 
beyond one’s circle of friends and family. After all, coronavirus is a “cosmopol-
itan virus” (Koopmans 2020; Cicchelli, Mesure forthcoming), which calls for 
a cosmopolitan or transnational response. The risk is that a strategy of limited 
solidarity could mean closed borders, and a surge in xenophobia, nationalism 
and populism. In other words, the risk is that we will choose isolation in the 
face of uncertainty instead of engaging in a concerted effort to minimize it.
These are important worries which should not be easily discounted. It 
should be noted, however, that the solidaristic approach defended here is 
not incompatible with international and even global solidarity. Indeed, such 
solidarity may be necessary in the case of pandemics, as argued before. While 
it is easier for individuals to see how they are interrelated to those near them, 
our globalized world is such that our relationships with others extend way be-
yond our communities to include not only our co-nationals but even people 
who live in faraway places. After all, the virus itself travelled from city to city, 
from airport to airport, from country to country, carried by individuals who 
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moved around for business and leisure. It may be said that its target is the 
global community: hence we need global solidarity to fight against it.
While not being incompatible with more far-reaching forms of solidarity, 
however, the approach defended here follows Banting and Kymlicka (2017) 
in focusing on a bounded form of solidarity which takes the nation-state 
as its reference unit. As Banting and Kymlicka note, not only do existing 
welfare states already rely on national (or bounded) solidarity, but there is 
no reason to think that extending this solidarity to encompass humanitarian 
duties towards ‘outsiders’ would level up the treatment of ‘outsiders’ instead 
of levelling down the treatment of ‘insiders’ (2017, 6). They also argue that 
“once bounded solidarity is in place, it may serve as a source for more global 
solidarity” and that “a commitment to global justice often grows out of na-
tional solidarities, rather than the suppressing of national solidarities” (Ban-
ting, Kymlicka 2017, 6, n. 9).11
A second objection to the solidaristic approach defended here may come 
from those who recognise the importance of acting for the sake of others, but 
believe that it is precisely for this reason that we should resist the measures 
imposed on us to contain the spread of the virus. A critical voice against the 
restrictions imposed by the Italian government in the wake of the Covid-19 
crisis, Giorgio Agamben has argued that the pandemic is just an “invention”, 
seized by governments as an opportunity to tighten their coercive control 
over citizens, thus creating the conditions for a “state of exception” that could 
persist indefinitely (2020a). This state of exception entails not only severe re-
strictions on individual freedoms, such as freedom of movement and associ-
ation (a fundamental prerequisite for political freedom, in Agamben’s view), 
but also a degeneration of the relationships between individuals, who are 
now fearful of any contact with their neighbours. In fact, the degeneration of 
human relationships – a direct consequence of the limitations on individual 
freedom imposed by the state – is even more problematic than the restrictions 
on freedom themselves. Because of the fears instilled by government agencies 
and the imposition of social distancing measures, individuals have begun to 
see others only as potential untori, that is, as ‘anointers’ or ‘plague-spreaders’, 
11 For a discussion of cosmopolitan concerns as arising from national solidarity see also 
Kymlicka and Walker 2012. For objections to the view that national solidarity is possi-
ble, necessary or even desirable see Levy 2017.
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hence a threat to other people (2020b). Consequently, face-to-face contacts 
are replaced by virtual ones, which do not allow for the same expressions of 
emotions and affection, stifling political discussion and activity. Individuals 
no longer believe in anything apart from “bare life”, and are ready to sacri-
fice everything – their freedoms and relationships – for the sake of survival 
(2020c). They become a passive and rarefied mass, ready to subject itself to 
the tyrannical power of a Leviathan.
As I have argued elsewhere (Magnani 2020), it is not clear which concept 
of freedom Agamben is making use of when he laments the loss of freedom 
experienced by those affected by measures aimed at containing the spread 
of coronavirus – including social distancing rules and more or less extensive 
lockdowns. This may appear as an issue of mere terminology, but it has im-
portant implications for the strength of Agamben’s claims, and for the ones 
made in this paper. When we say that public health measures imposed by 
governments in response to the Covid-19 crisis limit individual freedom, we 
may have in mind freedom from external interference (what in the literature 
is called ‘negative freedom’):12 we can no longer move around and act as we 
please without risking being stopped and fined. Alternatively, what we may 
have in mind is not freedom from interference as such, but freedom from 
arbitrary interference, or domination (what in the literature is referred to 
as ‘republican freedom’):13 the new rules imposed on us arbitrarily interfere 
with us because we have no say in the government’s decisions on the matter. 
Finally, we may understand freedom as self-mastery, or the freedom to be 
the persons we want to be (what in the literature in referred to as ‘positive 
freedom’):14 lockdowns, social distancing and other measures take away from 
us the kind of control we can exercise on our lives, both at the individual and 
the collective level.
It may perhaps help to frame Agamben’s concerns about freedom as con-
cerns about autonomy. As argued above, public health and safety measures, im-
posed by the state, can limit considerably the number and the kind of options 
that are available to us. Because having an array of different meaningful options 
is necessary to be autonomous, the fact that many of those options may now 
12 See Berlin 1958.
13 See Pettit 1997.
14 See Berlin 1958.
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be unavailable means that individuals’ autonomy is also diminished. Because 
of state-imposed lockdowns, many have lost their jobs, or cannot return to 
work for an indefinite period of time – in other words, they find themselves in 
a situation of extreme uncertainty and vulnerability. Their sense of self – that is, 
their notions of the kind of persons they are and of the place they occupy in the 
world – may also be under threat. Many have lost friends and family members, 
or have been battling with the disease themselves. They, too, can be at loss and 
feel that their sense of self and autonomy are diminished when their own lives 
and relationships with others are under attack.
All of this contributes to a loss of autonomy, and thus of our personal and 
political freedom (however one wants to define it). While options are taken 
away from us, governments use the pandemic as an opportunity to tighten 
their control over individuals. Such control is both psychological, in that it is 
aimed at instilling fear and distrust, and physical, in that it prevents people 
from exercising their freedom of movement and association. In this situation, 
solidarity is impossible: individuals become selfish and isolated. According 
to Agamben, protecting our freedom, our autonomy, our relationships (and 
especially our political relationships) requires standing up against state-im-
posed regulations and taking back control over our own lives.
Agamben’s view has some merits. It is a reminder that allowing govern-
ments to make use of exceptional means of power is risky: an authoritarian 
drift is always possible, and difficult to counteract. It also brings our attention 
to the issue of control and surveillance, and to the limits these impose on 
people’s opportunities to meet and do politics together. However, Agamben’s 
view presents some important limits. The most significant is the lack of at-
tention given to the relational aspects of public health measures, and to the 
fact that autonomy is itself a relational concept. Agamben worries about the 
freedom of individuals, but thinks of them as separate and separable entities; 
what he proposes is an individualistic rather than solidaritistic approach to 
the crisis. Take for instance his account of the ‘plague-spreader’ (untore). Ag-
amben argues that individuals now see others only as potential untori who 
can infect them at the slightest contact. However, if it is true that others can 
infect me, it must also be true that I could infect others. In other people’s 
eyes, I am the untore: our vulnerability is reciprocal. Staying away from them 
and complying with restrictions can thus be a way to protect others as well 
as myself. Agamben seems to miss this point: that it is not just in my self-in-
terest to isolate, wear a mask, get tested if I show symptoms, and so on. I am 
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doing it for others: for my elderly relatives, my neighbours who work at the 
hospital, or my immunocompromised friends. Seen under this light, accept-
ing a limitation on my options is an act of solidarity, rather than a symptom 
of weakness or fear. Doing so may allow others to survive and thrive, and 
protect my relationships with them, which are also necessary for my auton-
omy and well-being.
As mentioned earlier, critics of restrictive measures to contain the spread 
of the virus may not be against solidarity as a principle of action. On the con-
trary, they may be moved by a concern for preserving the political and social 
conditions for solidarity, as Agamben does. One problem is that a concern for 
solidarity, when not backed up by an understanding of vulnerability, sense 
of self and autonomy in relational terms may end up undermining those 
very conditions that make solidarity possible. A further problem arises when 
individuals do not trust public institutions and elected officials to implement 
effective measures for the benefit of society as a whole. As argued in the 
previous section, solidarity is a collective effort: it only works if a sufficient 
number of people do their part, and if a relation of trust exists between them 
and other political actors such as governments and elected officials. This is 
why it is essential that public institutions act fairly and transparently. Lack 
of trust in them may be caused by past instances of corruption and lack 
of accountability, which undermine their integrity and reliability as sources 
of solidarity. In addition, public institutions and elected authorities may be 
unsuccessful in communicating clearly with members of the public, partly be-
cause of a failure on their part and partly because of a resistance from the public 
itself to believe what they are told by public officials and scientific experts – a 
phenomenon which is linked to the issue of distrust towards public institutions 
and the spread of fake news on and off the internet. When the conditions for 
solidarity are not met, it is easier for individuals to see solidarity measures 
as impinging upon individuals’ freedom, and governments and public in-
stitutions as powerful oppressors engaging in a well-organized conspiracy to 
reduce individuals’ rights.
It should now be apparent that the solidaristic approach defended here 
may encounter some difficulties. On the one hand, there might be people 
who are unwilling to comply. These individuals may fail to acknowledge our 
interconnectedness and interdependence, and argue that we should not be 
expected to care for others when our own interests are under threat. On the 
other hand, there might be those who do not believe that the virus consti-
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tutes a serious threat such that governments are justified in imposing restric-
tions on our freedom in the name of an ‘invention’ (as Agamben calls it). In 
their view, state-imposed measures are suspicious and may never be justified 
or proportional to the threat, which is negligible.
Implementing a public health system based on relational solidarity can 
take time, and does require individuals to be motivated by a concern for 
the most vulnerable. Hence it may be argued that it is an unfeasible project. 
I do not think it is: the fact that something is difficult to achieve does not 
mean that it is impossible to achieve, or that we should stop striving for it. 
Besides, the alternatives do not seem promising. Individual and institutional 
political actors need to realize that we are all vulnerable, and that the only 
way to make us less vulnerable is cooperation, trust and solidarity. Doing so 
would enhance individuals’ autonomy, well-being, and help them maintain 
a healthy sense of self. At the same time, societies need to recognize that not 
everyone is vulnerable to the same degree. Covid-19 is not the great equal-
izer: if we want to defeat it, we need to be sensitive to the ways in which the 
most vulnerable are the most badly affected by it.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued against the view that Covid-19 is the ‘great equal-
izer’. I have done so by defending a solidaristic approach to public health 
based on relational concepts such as vulnerability, sense of self, autonomy 
and solidarity. Contrary to the claim that Covid-19 is the great equalizer, I 
maintain that it is in fact contributing to the deepening of existing inequal-
ities and vulnerabilities. While relational solidarity in public health may be 
difficult to implement, it is the best resource we have in these times of uncer-
tainty. To be successful in its pursuit, solidarity needs to be a collective effort, 
involving different political actors such as individuals and public institutions, 
engaging with each other on the basis of a relationship of trust. While a com-
mitment to solidarity can be easily undermined by (more or less justified) 
scepticism towards political and other authorities, and by the failures of those 
authorities themselves, it is paramount that societies strive for it as the best 
means to preserve individuals’ health and well-being.
References
Agamben G. (2020a), “L’invenzione di un’epidemia”, in Quodlibet [online], 26 Fe-
bruary 2020, https://www.quodlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-linvenzione-di-un-epi-
demia [Accessed 23 September 2020].
– (2020b), “Contagio”, in Quodlibet [online], 11 March 2020, https://www.quodli-
bet.it/giorgio-agamben-contagio> [Accessed 23 September 2020].
– (2020c), “Chiarimenti”, in Quodlibet [online], 17 March 2020, https://www.quo-
dlibet.it/giorgio-agamben-chiarimenti> [Accessed 23 September 2020].
Banting K., Kymlicka W. (2017), “Introduction: The Political Sources of Solidarity 
Diverse Societies”, in K. Banting, W. Kymlicka (eds), The Strains of Commitment: 
The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 1-58.
Bayertz K. (1999), “Four Uses of ‘Solidarity’”, in K. Bayertz (ed.), Solidarity, Dor-
drecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 3-28.
Baylis F., Kenny N.P., Sherwin S. (2008), “A Relational Account of Public Health 
Ethics”, Public Health Ethics, vol. 1, n. 3, pp. 196-209.
Bellagio Group (2007), Bellagio Statement of Principles, http://www.bioethicsinsti-
tute.org/research/global-bioethics/flu-pandemic-the-bellagio-meeting [Accessed 
15 November 2020].
Berlin I. (1958), “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in I. Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating Four 
Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 166-218.
Bernardini M.G., Casalini B., Giolo O., Re L. (2018), Vulnerabilità: etica, politica e 
diritto, Roma, IF Press.
Blundell R., Costa Dias M., Joyce R., Xu X. (2020), “COVID-19 and Inequalities”, 
Fiscal Studies, vol. 41, n. 2, pp. 291-319. 
Butler J. (2004), Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, London, Verso.
– (2009), Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, London, Verso.
Cavarero A. (2007), Orrorismo, ovvero la violenza sull’inerme, Milano, Feltrinelli.
Ceva E. (2016), Interactive Justice: A Proceduralist Approach to Value Conflict in Politics, 
New York, Routledge.
– (2018), “Political Corruption as Relational Injustice”, Social Philosophy & Policy, 
vol. 35, n. 2, pp. 118-137. 
Cicchelli V., Mesure S. (forthcoming), Reimagining the Cosmopolis: Living in a 
Post-Lockdown Humanity / Living as a Pandemic Humanity, Leiden, Brill. 
Christman J. (1991), “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom”, Ethics, vol. 
101, n. 2, pp. 343-359. 
Dean J. (1995), “Reflective Solidarity”, Constellations, vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 114-140.
21
Noemi Magnani 
The ‘Great Equalizer’? Autonomy, 
Vulnerability and Solidarity 
in Uncertain Times
Fineman M.A. (2008), “The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State”, Emory 
Law Journal, vol. 60, n. 2, pp. 251-275.
Garnett M. (2013), “The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View”, Australasian Jour-
nal of Philosophy, vol. 92, n. 1, pp. 143-158.
Goodin R.E. (1985), Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibi-
lities, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Hoedemaekers R., Gordijn B., Pijnenburg M. (2007), “Solidarity and Justice as 
Guiding Principles in Genomic Research”, Bioethics, vol. 21, n. 6, pp. 342-350.
Houtepen R., ter Muelen R. (2000), “New Types of Solidarity in the European 
Welfare State”, Health Care Analysis, vol. 8, n. 4, pp. 329-340.
Jennings B. (2007), “Public Health and Civic Republicanism: Toward an Alter-
native Framework for Public Health Ethics”, in A. Dawson, M. Verweij, Ethics, 
Prevention and Public Health, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 30-58.
Kolers A. (2016), A Moral Theory of Solidarity, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Koopmans R. (2020), “The Cosmopolitan Virus - Covid-19 Does Not Strike 
Randomly”, WZB, Berlin Social Science Center [online], 4 April, https://www.
wzb.eu/en/research/corona-und-die-folgen/das-kosmopolitische-virus-vor-coro-
na-sind-nicht-alle-gleich [Accessed 23 September 2020].
Kotalik J. (2005), “Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: Ethical Issues”, Bioethics, 
vol. 19, n. 4, pp. 422-431.
Kymlicka W., Walker K. (2012), Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World, 
Vancouver, UBC Press.
Levy J. (2017), “Against Fraternity”, in K. Banting, W. Kymlicka (eds), The Strains of 
Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 107-124.
MacIntyre A. (1999), Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues, Chicago - La Salle (Illinois), Open Court.
Mackenzie C., Stoljar N. (2000), “Autonomy Refigured”, in C. Mackenzie, N. 
Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the 
Social Self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 3-31.
Mackenzie C., Rogers W., Dodds S. (2012), “Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of Vulne-
rability”, International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, vol. 5, n. 2, pp. 11-38.
– (2013), Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Magnani N. (2020), “Spreading the ‘Plague’: Vulnerability, Solidarity and Auto-
nomy in the Time of Pandemic”, Revista de Filosofie Aplicată, vol. 3, Supplemen-
tary issue, pp. 69-81. 
Mein S.A. (2020), “COVID-19 and Health Disparities: The Reality of ‘the Great 
Equalizer’”, Journal of General Internal Medicine, vol. 35, n. 8, pp. 2439-2440.
Noemi Magnani 
The ‘Great Equalizer’? Autonomy, 
Vulnerability and Solidarity 
in Uncertain Times
22
Nozick R. (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford, Blackwell.
Persson I., Savulescu J. (2012), Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhance-
ment, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Pettit P. (1997), Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford, Cla-
rendon Press.
Powell R., Buchanan A. (2016), “The Evolution of Moral Enhancement”, in S. Clar-
ke, J. Savulescu, T. Coady, A. Giubilini, S. Sanyal, The Ethics of Human Enhance-
ment: Understanding the Debate, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 239-260.
Raz J. (1986), The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Rogers, W. (2006), “Feminism and Public Health Ethics”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 
vol. 32, n. 6, pp. 351-354.
Sangiovanni A. (2017), Humanity without Dignity: Moral Equality, Respect and Hu-
man Rights, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
Schechtman M. (2011), “The Narrative Self ”, in S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 394-416.
Schroeder D., Gefenas E. (2009), “Vulnerability: Too Vague and Too Broad?”, Cam-
bridge Quarterly Healthcare Ethics, vol. 18, n. 2, pp. 113-121. 
Straehle C. (2017), Vulnerability, Autonomy and Applied Ethics, London - New York, 
Routledge.
Tronto J.C. (1993), Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, New 
York and London, Routledge.
– (2010), “Creating Caring Institutions: Politics, Plurality, and Purpose”, Ethics and 
Social Welfare, vol. 4, n. 2, pp. 158-171.
– (2015), Who Cares? How to Reshape a Democratic Politics, Ithaca-London, Cornell 
University Press.
Velleman J.D. (2005), Self to Self : Selected Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
Westlund A.C. (2009), “Rethinking Relational Autonomy”, Hypatia, vol. 24, n. 4, 
pp. 26-49. 
Wildt A. (1999), “Solidarity: Its History and Contemporary Definition”, in K. 
Bayertz (ed.), Solidarity, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 209-220.
